Market Boundaries
These papers explore the possible grounds for regarding the market as an unsuitable framework for certain kinds of social practices, and hence for their exclusion or protection from the market domain. The focus is mainly on practices of a broadly cultural character, such as broadcasting, the arts, and academic research.
The political context for this theoretical work was the radical programme of institutional reform introduced by governments in the UK (and elsewhere) since the 1980s. This has included significant extensions of the market into previously non-market domains, and the promotion of commercially modelled forms of organisation and conceptual representation.
Full bibliographical information is provided in the initial footnote of each paper, and this should be used in any citations.
 Consumer Sovereignty and the Integrity of Practices 1990
This paper presents a case for protecting cultural institutions from the market by drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s conception of social practices, with their own internal goods and standards of excellence. It argues that an especially problematic feature of markets is ‘the sovereignty of consumers’, since consumer judgments may not be based on the same criteria as those employed by cultural practitioners, who may thus have to choose between maintaining the integrity of the practice and securing its material resources.
The Moral Boundaries of the Market 1993
This develops a theoretical framework for thinking about market boundaries, starting from Michael Walzer’s account of the separation of spheres and the risk of market domination. It explores the relationship between Walzer, Marx and Hegel, distinguishes goods-based from justice-based arguments for boundaries, and argues that the protection of various goods from the market requires attention to the conditions of their production rather than their exchange.
Scepticism, Authority and the Market 1994
This paper defends arguments for the protection of cultural practices from the market against the charge of elitism. Distinguishing ‘elitism of access’ from ‘elitism of judgment’, it explores how anti-elitism of the latter kind is supported by scepticism about values, and criticises justifications for the market that appeal to such scepticism. It argues that while the kind of epistemically based authority required by cultural practices implies the rejection of scepticism, such authority is not only compatible with, but conducive to, the autonomy of individuals.
Citizens, Consumers and the Environment 1994
In The Economy of the Earth, Mark Sagoff argues that the basic error in using cost-benefit analysis to make environmental decisions is that it requires people to think and act in their role as consumers, rather than as citizens. In response, is argued that what should also be recognised is that when deliberating and acting as citizens, people must consider the value both of the environment and of consumption, and make collective decisions about the priority to be given to these common goods when they conflict.
Values and Preferences in Neo-Classical Environmental Economics 1997
This paper explores theoretical problems in the use of cost-benefit analysis for environmental decision-making, arising from defects in the neo-classical concept of preferences. It argues that preferences depend on judgments, and that people’s judgments about their own well-being must be distinguished from their ethical judgments about the ‘existence value’ or ‘rights’ of non-human species. Failure to recognise this leads to illegitimate applications of market-modelled criteria to environmental decisions.
Delivering the Goods: Socialism, Liberalism and the Market 1997
This paper explores the relationships between goods-based arguments for market boundaries and wider debates and traditions in political theory. It argues that ‘classical’ justifications for the market, with their focus on human well-being, are more amenable to arguments for non-market provision than ‘liberal’ justifications that focus on contractual exchange, and criticises contemporary neutralist liberalism for excluding the substantive concerns about markets and goods that have been central to socialist and conservative traditions of political thought.
Colonisation by the Market: Walzer on Recognition 1997
Taking up Michael Walzer’s comment that colonisation (or domination) may result from an ‘illicit transfer of meanings’ from one sphere to another, it is argued that his own account of ‘modern’ recognition provides a possible example of this, with its subjective and competitive nature apparently being modelled on features of the market domain. This modern form of recognition, it is suggested, threatens the integrity of social practices such as scientific enquiry which require an objective, non-competitive mode of recognition. [See Science and Recognition (PDF) for a development of this argument]
Market Boundaries and the Commodification of Culture 1999
This paper argues that the protection of cultural practices from the market can be justified by showing how this enhances the ability of markets themselves to contribute to human well-being. The argument is developed through an analysis of how the value of certain kinds of consumer goods is realised outwith the economy, through their use in various social practices, and of how non-market cultural practices enable judgments to be made about the possible benefits of consumer goods.
Market Boundaries and Human Goods 2000
Arguments for the protection of cultural practices from the market are often criticised because they imply the use of state powers to support authoritative judgments about human goods, and thus fall foul of a liberal principle of state neutrality. This paper argues that state support for market institutions is no more consistent with neutrality than its support for non-market ones: in both cases, collective decisions have to be made about the provision of distinct kinds of human goods.
Science and Recognition 2000
Through a critical commentary on sociological analyses of the organisation of modern science, this paper explores generic problems in the institutional design of social practices, giving particular attention to the nature and role of recognition. It argues for the importance of recognition in the form both of ‘moral acknowledgment’ and of ‘epistemic confirmation’, and also points to the damaging effects of the direct and competitive pursuit of recognition, and hence to the dangers posed to science and other practices by market-modelled institutional changes.
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